James Madison University

JMU Scholarly Commons
Global CWD Repository

Center for International Stabilization and Recovery

8-12-1997

DDASaccident153
Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database
AID

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons,
Public Policy Commons, and the Social Policy Commons
Recommended Citation
Database, Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident, "DDASaccident153" (1997). Global CWD Repository. 353.
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd/353

This Other is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Global CWD Repository by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact dc_admin@jmu.edu.

DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 17/05/2006

Accident number: 153

Accident time: not recorded

Accident Date: 12/08/1997

Where it occurred: Jangalak, Ward 7,
Kabul

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Unavoidable (?)

Secondary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: [No date recorded]

ID original source: none

Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: PMN-2 AP blast

Ground condition: grass/grazing area
hard

Date record created: 13/02/2004

Date last modified: 13/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate metal-detector (?)
handtool may have increased injury (?)
partner's failure to "control" (?)
request for clearance with explosive charge (?)
request for machine to assist (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
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Accident report
At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly
"controlled" his partner.
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly
available. The following summarises its content.
The victim had been a deminer since November 1995. It had been two months since the
victim attended a revision course and 23 days since his last leave. The accident occurred on
ground described as a riverbank that was hard, grassy and uneven.
The investigators decided that the victim had got a reading with his detector and investigated
it but found nothing. He swept the area again and still got a reading, so without remarking the
spot, he squatted to prod again [presumed to have been wearing his helmet and visor].
The Section Leader stated that the victim marked the reading on both occasions and was
working properly except that he had failed to get a precise detector reading and so prodded
too hard in the wrong place. He blamed ground contamination with many fragments and the
ground hardness and recommended that such sites be cleared with a back-hoe machine.
The Project Supervisor stated the ground was unsuitable for prodding prone, so the victim
was right to squat and was working properly. He recommended the use of explosive charges
to investigate such readings.
The victim stated that he was working properly – and cited his small injuries to support his
argument. He also said that his application for leave had been rejected and he might have
been distracted.

Conclusion
The investigators concluded that the accident occurred because the victim failed to mark the
position accurately, so prodded onto the top of the mine. He was prodding in a squatting
position and without wearing the "anti-fragment" jacket [this may be misleading because fragjackets were not provided - see “Analysis”].

Recommendations
The investigators recommended that all deminers must try to narrow down detector readings
before starting to prod, that the Section Leader should be "strongly advised" because of his
poor command and control, and that the anti-frag jacket should be worn when prodding in a
squatting position. They added that field management should seriously consider the leave
requirements of deminers.

Victim Report
Victim number: 196

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Helmet

Protection used: Helmet, Thin, short
visor

Thin, short visor
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Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Arms
minor Leg
minor Neck
severe Hand
severe Hearing
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Fingers
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
The victim's injuries were summarised as three fingers of his right hand amputated, his eardrum burst, and minor injuries to his right thigh, arms and neck.
A medic's sketch (reproduced below) included lower right leg injuries.

The demining group reported that the victim had sustained injuries to his right ring and middle
fingers fractured and lacerated wounds to the right arm and superficial wounds to his right leg.
A disability claim was forwarded to the insurers on 12th August 1997 (but only forwarded for
processing on 22nd January 1998). In this the "disability" was given as "left ear total
deafness", and "right ear 20-30% total hearing loss".
No record of a compensation payment was found in June 1998.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as "Unavoidable" because it seems likely that the
victim was working properly (within the procedures of his group). If he was not marking his
detector readings correctly, that would represent a “Field control inadequacy” because his
error was not corrected.
The investigator's claim that he should have been wearing a fragmentation jacket (if not
working prone) must be seen in context. Two heavy NATO frag-jackets per team had been
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issued some years before. Excavating in a squatting position was the norm, rather than an
exception, so the jackets could not be used by everyone who needed them. As a result the
jackets were very seldom worn (in any case, some were reported to have been
commandeered by the Taliban forces).
It is a serious management failing that the UN MAC had long been aware that squatting to
prod was common but had not addressed protective needs adequately, preferring to insist
that the deminers under their indirect control should lie prone. They knew this was ignored
because the data in their own accident reports showed that they did not. A similarly blinkered
ignorance about the adequacy of thin visors and short AK bayonets also prevailed. The hand
damage suffered in this accident illustrates the risks associated with short handtools.
The victim's severe deafness is common in Afghan claims at this time, when insurance
favoured such injury and testing the validity of the claims was hard.
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.
Gathering of further accident and medical treatment detail was prevented by the UN
programme manager who denied all access to records in September 1999. Access has
continued to be denied up to the date of completion of this version of the database.
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